In Action Report on the action at St Julien
on Monday 26th April 1915
Reference Belgium sheet 28 1/40,000
1. On the morning of the 26th April 1915 the Northumberland Brigade (4th, 5th, 6th & 7th Battalions Northumberland Fusiliers) were concentrated at Wieltje and placed under the orders of the 1st Canadian Division as Reserve.
At 10.15 am General Riddell commanding the Northumberland Brigade received orders from the G.O.C 10th Sub Brigade to verify a report received from the 28th Division that the enemy were breaking through the first line trucks in D 13 c & d and to counter attack with whatever force he considered necessary. The 5th Btn Northumberland Fusiliers was directed at 10.45 AM to send forward an officers patrol to verify the report & to proceed with his Battalion to Fortuin with a view to counter attacking if the enemy were discovered breaking through. By 12 noon the officer commanding this Battalion was satisfied that no attempt was being made by the enemy to break through at the place indicated and so his battalion has being heavily shelled to proceed to dig in and remained in the position he had reached and consequently took no part in the subsequent operations.
2 At 1.30 pm operation orders from the 1st Canadian division were received.
It will be seen from these orders that the Brigade was to attack St Julien in cooperation with the Lahore Division and one battalion of the 10th Infantry Brigade and that the assault was to take place at 2.5 pm.
The distance from Wieltje to St Julien is approximately 1 3/4 miles and the ground had not previously been reconnoitered by the staff or any of the officers of the Brigade. No information was received or could be obtained as to the actual position of either our own or the enemys trenches nor was it known that the G.H.Q line was strongly wired and that there were only certain places through which the troops would be able to pass.
No communication was ever made with the artillery and no artillery officer got in any way into touch with the Brigade. The time was short, the order to attack being received at 1.30 pm.
Nevertheless considering that any failure to attack on the part of the Brigade might seriously hamper the operations General Riddell decided to carry out the orders he had received impossible as they seemed.
By 1.50 pm the Battalions were on the move the 6th Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers attacking with the right Wieltje - St Julien road and the 4th battalion Northumberland Fusiliers with their left on the road. The 7th Bn Northumberland Fusiliers was ordered to follow the 4th bn in the second line.
At 2.5 pm the leading battalions reached the G.H.Q in C22b and C23c and came under very heavy shell and rifle fire. The Battalions deployed on both sides of the Wieltje - St Julien and lost very heavily by not having reconnoitered the openings to the wire entanglements in front of the line of trenches.
However they found places and the advance towards St Julien continued steadily both battalions in the front line suffering heavily from machine gun fire apparently coming from the wood in C17 A on their left flank.
By 2.45 pm both of the leading Battalions had reached the front line of our trenches in C17b and the 7th Battalion had been absorbed in the attack.
At 3.10pm isolated parties of the 6th Northumberlands on the left of the road pushed forward about 250 yards in front of our first line trench and occupied some small trenches from which the enemy had apparently retreated. The 4th and 7th Northumberlands were unable to make any advance.
During the whole of this period no signs of the Lahore Division or the battalion of the 10th Brigade had been observed and it was subsequently ascertained that the movement of this battalion had been cancelled although no verification has been sent to the Northumberland Brigade.
The culminating point in the advance of the 6th Btn Northumberland Fusiliers was reached at about 3.45pm when unsupported on their left flank and heavily shelled with high explosive shells they were compelled to dig themselves in and remained in possession of the ground they had gained until dusk when they returned to the first line trenches.
At 3.30pm Bigadier general Riddell accompanied by his Brigade Officer left his HQ in C23a and proceeded towards Farm Vanchule in C17d for the purpose of getting into closer touch with his battalion Commanders and was shot through the head 150yards to the south of the farm at 3.45pm. The command devolved to Colonel Foster 4th Northumberland Fusiliers, the senior officer present with the battalions and a message was sent to Col Coles CMS DSO commanding t he 5th Northumberlands informing him of General Riddell's death and that the command of the Brigade had devolved to him.
The position of Colonel Cole's HQ was not actually known and it was not until about 7pm that he arrived at Brigade HQ. Orders had however been issued by Colonel Foster for the battalion to remain where they were until dusk and at 7.30pm Col Coles having ascertained that the services of the Brigade in the first line trench were not required, ordered the troops to return to bivouac at Wieltje.
149th Brigade war diary